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Abstract	
This	paper	examines	how	law	and	legal	analysis	fit	within	the	broader	green	criminological	
project.	By	demonstrating	how	legal	analysis	in	various	forms	can	cast	significant	light	on	key	
green	 criminological	 questions,	 the	 paper	 seeks	 to	 address	 the	 concern	 that	 green	
criminology	–	with	its	preponderance	of	 ‘deep	green’	viewpoints	and	focus	on	social	harms	
which	are	not	proscribed	by	formal	law	–	precludes	the	application	of	legalistic	values	such	
as	certainty	and	consistency.	Ultimately,	the	goal	of	the	paper	is	to	demonstrate	how,	despite	
the	novel	challenges	to	the	legal	scholar	presented	by	green	criminology,	the	incorporation	of	
a	more	 legalistic	 perspective	within	 an	 interdisciplinary	 exercise	 is	 not	 only	 desirable	 for	
green	 criminology	 but	 is	 in	 fact	 vital	 if	 the	 field	 is	 to	 realise	 its	 ambitions	 as	 a	 force	 for	
environmental	good.		
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Introduction	
In	 recent	 years	 green	 criminology	 has	 blossomed	 into	 a	 key	 area	 of	 criminological	 debate,	
attracting	 numerous	 commentators	 and	 prompting	 a	 host	 of	 symposia,	workshops	 and	 other	
events,	as	well	as	dedicated	panels	at	major	criminology	and	criminal	 justice	conferences	(see	
greencriminology.com).	Like	more	‘mainstream’	and	established	forms	of	criminology	before	it,	
green	 criminology	has	 from	 the	 outset	 constituted	 somewhat	 of	 a	 ‘rendezvous’	 subject	 (Rock	
and	 Holdaway	 1997)	 attracting	 commentators	 from	 sociological	 backgrounds	 (politics,	
sociology,	 anthropology,	 and	 so	 on)	 as	well	 as	more	 legalistic	 fields	 (especially	 criminal	 law,	
international	 law	 and	 environmental	 law).	 Of	 course,	 the	 virtues	 of	 such	 an	 interdisciplinary	
approach	are	widely	touted	in	most	academic	disciplines	(see	Matthews	and	Ross	2010)	and	for	
good	 reason.	 Drawing	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 sources	 and	 perspectives	 almost	 inevitably	 provides	
deeper	understanding	as	well	as	the	scope	for	transposing	ideas	and	solutions	between	subject	
areas	 (see	 Lury	 and	Wakeford	 2012).	 The	 benefits	 of	 interdisciplinary	 work	 have	 been	 well	
recognised	by	criminologists	(Dupont‐Morales	1998;	Walsh	and	Ellis	2007)	and	criminology	as	
a	whole	has	thus	benefitted	as	a	result	of	the	cross‐pollination	between	legal	scholarships	(and	
especially	 scholarship	on	criminal	 law)	and	more	sociologically‐derived	 accounts	of	offending	
and	the	criminal	justice	system	in	its	operational	context	(see	Doak	2007).		
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The	argument	of	this	paper	is	that,	whilst	similar	interdisciplinary	benefits	will	certainly	accrue	
to	the	study	of	green	criminology	from	a	close	alignment	with	 legal	 fields,	 to	some	extent	this	
may	be	more	of	a	challenging	proposition	than	was	the	case	for	many	of	the	more	established	
areas	of	criminology.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	in	many	cases	the	activities	discussed	by	green	
criminologists	 are	 legally	 permitted;	 and	 in	 most	 cases	 are	 certainly	 not	 proscribed	 by	 the	
criminal	law.	Given	this	reality,	this	paper	offers	discussion	of	the	place	of	 ‘law’	(criminal,	civil	
and	administrative)	in	green	criminological	debate,	the	challenges	inherent	in	this	combination	
of	 fields,	 and	 how	 such	 a	 pooling	 of	 knowledges	will	 nevertheless	 enhance	 the	 overall	 green	
criminological	project.	This	paper	 therefore	calls	 for	 further	collaboration	between	academics	
from	 the	more	 ‘sociological’	 and	 ‘legal’	 sides	of	 the	 criminological	 spectrum,	 arguing	 that	 this	
continued	(and	further)	multiisciplinarity	is	not	only	a	desirable	aspect	of	green	criminology	but	
a	vital	one.	
	
Green	criminology:	‘Theory’	and	scope		
After	some	early	disagreement	concerning	the	labelling	of	‘green	criminology’	(see	Halsey	2004;	
Ruggiero	 and	 South	 2010)	 the	 term	 itself	 has	 in	 recent	 years	 achieved	 broad	 usage	 as	 an	
umbrella	 concept,	 albeit	 one	which	does	 not	 necessitate	 specific	 adherence	 to	 set	 theories	or	
methods.	Indeed	one	must	be	wary	here	of	Kearon	and	Godfrey’s	warning	against	the	academic	
tendency	 to	 ‘force	 social	 phenomena	 into	 false	 chronologies’	 (Kearon	 and	Godfrey	 2007:	 30).	
Arguably,	 it	 is	 precisely	 this	 restrictive	 approach	 that	 has	 forestalled	 the	 development	 and	
expansion	of	criminology	along	environmental	lines	until	more	recent	years.	Labelling	a	subject	
area	 ‘green	 criminology’	 is	 useful	 in	 that	 it	 might	 signify	 a	 set	 of	 assumptions,	 theoretical	
underpinnings	 and	methodological	 issues	 but,	 as	 ever,	 such	 classifications	 are	 just	 labels,	 the	
meanings	 of	 which	 are	 in	 constant	 flux,	 especially	 in	 such	 a	 new	 and	 rapidly‐evolving	 area.	
Indeed,	White	(2013)	and	South	(1998)	argue	‘there	is	no	green	criminology	theory	[emphasis	
in	original]	as	such’	(White	2013:	22)	and	 ‘those	who	are	doing	green	criminology	define	it	 in	
ways	that	best	suit	their	own	conception	of	what	it	is	they	are	doing’	(White	2013:17).		
	
Clearly	therefore	green	criminology	is	developing	as	an	inclusive	field	of	interest	rather	than	a	
restrictive	 body	 of	 scholarship	 adhering	 to	 set	 paradigms.	 Indeed,	 for	 White	 the	 benefit	 of	
singling	 out	 and	 labelling	 ‘green	 criminology’	 lies	mainly	 in	 providing	 a	 focal	 point	 for	 those	
interested	 in	 studying	 environmental	 harms	 and	 society’s	 responses	 to	 them.	 This	 of	 course	
bodes	 well	 for	 an	 interdisciplinary	 approach	 encompassing	 both	 legal	 and	 sociological	
perspectives.	 For	 example,	 Gibbs	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 draw	 a	 key	 distinction	 between	 ‘legalistic’	
understandings	of	environmental	crimes	(as	violations	of	criminal	laws	designed	to	protect	the	
health	 and	 safety	 of	 people,	 the	 environment	 or	 both)	 and	 the	 socio‐legal	 approach,	 which	
acknowledges	 that	 the	 differences	 between	 ‘crime’,	 ‘deviance’,	 ‘civil	 wrongs’	 and	 ‘regulatory	
violations’	are	all	socially	constructed.	What	is	difficult	from	a	criminal	law	perspective	however	
is	 that	 frequently	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 environmental	 harm	 rather	 than	 environmental	 crime	 we	 are	
discussing	 as	 green	 criminologists.	 This	 perspective	 is	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 the	 critical	 and	
radical	 criminological	 schools	 which,	 in	 short	 form,	 problematise	 the	 labelling	 of	 harmful	
activities	 as	 crimes	 (or	 not)	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 power	 inequalities	 endemic	 to	 society.	 Thus,	
McBarnet	(1983)	is	heavily	critical	of	traditional	criminology’s	‘too‐ready	acceptance	of	official	
definitions	 of	 criminal	 and	 victim	 [which]	 have	 reinforced	 rather	 than	 questioned	 the	 status	
quo’	(McBarnet	1983:	302).		
	
To	give	an	example	of	this	critical	perspective	in	action	we	can	look	to	the	work	of	Lynch	and	
Stretesky	 (2001).	 In	 this	 seminal	 green	 criminological	 piece,	 these	 authors	 analysed	 the	
question	of	corporate	harm	and	violence,	utilising	evidence	from	medical	literature	and	related	
studies	 that	 focused	 on	 the	 health	 consequences	 associated	 with	 toxic	 waste,	 pesticide	 and	
dioxin	 exposure.	 In	 so	 doing,	 they	 argue	 that	 the	 significant	 health	 consequences	 associated	
with	modern	 industrial	production	of	 toxic	waste	products	 ‘can	be	 thought	of	as	 “criminal”	 in	
Matthew	Hall:	The	Role	and	Use	of	Law	in	Green	Criminology	
IJCJ&SD							98	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2014	3(2)	
the	broadest	sense	since	alternative,	nontoxic	methods	of	production	are	often	available’	(Lynch	
and	 Stretesky	 2001:	 153).	 This	 is	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 the	 strict	 legalistic	 sense	 such	
corporations	 are	 not	 breaking	 any	 laws	 (criminal	 or	 otherwise).	 The	 critical	 school	 thus	
highlights	that,	under	such	circumstances,	‘it	is	not	deviance	from,	but	adherence	to,	legal	norms	
that	presents	itself	as	problematic’	(Halsey	2004:	225).	
	
More	 recently,	Passas	 (2005)	has	offered	 support	 for	 the	 critical	perspective	by	branding	 the	
actions	of	many	large	corporations	as	‘lawful	but	awful’.	As	the	author	contends:	
	
By	concentrating	on	what	is	officially	deﬁned	as	illegal	or	criminal,	an	even	more	
serious	 threat	 to	 society	 is	 left	 out.	This	 threat	 is	 caused	by	 a	host	 of	 company	
practices	that	are	within	the	letter	of	the	law	and	yet,	they	have	multiple	adverse	
social	 consequences.	 Quite	 often,	 the	 main	 reason	 why	 these	 practices	 remain	
legal	 and	 respected	 is	 that	 these	 industries	 are	 able	 to	 mobilize	 financial	 and	
other	resources	in	order	to	avoid	stricter	regulation.	(Passas	2005:	773)	
	
Although	Passas	is	not	primarily	concerned	with	environmental	crime	or	harm	in	his	discussion,	
the	argument	that	much	environmentally	harmful	activity	(whether	carried	out	by	corporations,	
states	 or	 individuals)	 is	 in	 fact	 permissible	 under	 the	 law	 (or,	 at	 the	 very	most,	 constitutes	 a	
legal	‘grey	area’	(Gibbs	et	al.	2010))	is	a	recurring	theme	of	the	green	criminological	literature.		
	
The	 above	 notwithstanding,	 in	many	 jurisdictions	 there	 does	 exist	 a	wide	 body	 of	 ‘hard’	 law	
concerned	with	 the	 environment,	 the	 functioning	 of	which	 is	 clearly	 of	 key	 concern	 to	 green	
criminologists.	 Indeed,	 the	 sheer	 volume	 of	 such	 environmental	 laws	 on	 the	 statute	 books	 in	
most	countries	and	at	the	international	level	is	rapidly	increasing	(Brickey	2012).	In	the	UK	at	
least,	 criminal	 law	 has	 arguably	 been	 the	 traditional	 approach	 to	 tackling	 environmental	
degradation	 (Bell	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Across	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 as	 a	 whole,	 EU	 Directive	
2008/99/EC	 on	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 environment	 through	 the	 criminal	 law	 specifically	
requires	EU	member	states	to	apply	criminal	sanctions	to	enforce	EU	environmental	law.	That	
said,	 many	 commentators	 in	 the	 wider	 literature	 now	 contend	 that	 civil	 and	 administrative	
mechanisms	 and	 sanctions	 offer	 many	 distinct	 advantages	 over	 the	 criminal	 enforcement	 of	
environmental	standards	(see	Faure	and	Svatikova	2012).		
	
Of	course,	given	the	breadth	of	possible	contributors	and	perspectives	relevant	to	the	debates	at	
hand,	the	idea	that	any	law	(much	less	criminal	law)	can	or	should	constitute	the	sole	solution	to	
the	 problems	 of	 environmental	 harm	 is	 surely	 wrong.	 For	 legal	 commentators,	 the	 difficulty	
with	a	 field	 that	 is	apparently	so	wide	 is	 that	 it	 sits	uncomfortably	with	classic	doctrinal	 legal	
ideals	 of	 certainty	 and	 predictability.	 In	 fact	 the	 distinction	 can	 be	 said	 to	 reflect	 traditional	
philosophical	debates	(deriving	from	the	works	of	Weber	(Rheinstein	1954))	in	law	concerning	
internal	and	external	 legal	analysis.	 In	 the	 former	case	 the	 law	 is	analysed	by	 reference	 to	 its	
internal	workings,	its	consistency	and	its	efficiency.	By	contrast	external	evaluations	of	law	seek	
to	 place	 law	 in	 its	 social	 context,	 often	 by	 studying	 its	 operation	 empirically,	 and	 seeking	 to	
evaluate	 its	effectiveness	 in	 that	context.	The	socio‐legal	approach	 is	 clearly	constituent	of	 the	
latter	category,	which	can	frustrate	those	seeking	a	more	analytical/internal	perspective.		
	
A	 good	 example	 of	 the	 tensions	 which	 can	 develop	 between	 legalistic	 and	 socio‐legalistic	
approaches	to	the	question	of	environmental	crime/harm	is	drawn	by	Chris	Williams	(1996)	in	
his	 green	 criminological	 (or	 perhaps	 more	 accurately,	 green	 victimological)	 discussion	 of	
environmental	victimisation.	Williams	begins	his	argument	by	acknowledging	the	‘limits	of	law’	
(Williams	1996:	200)	in	addressing	environmental	victimisation	and	further	notes	the	‘obvious	
need	 for	 social	 justices	 to	parallel	 formal	 legal	 processes’	 (Williams	1996:	 200).	Nevertheless	
Williams	 is	also	keen	to	develop	some	 form	of	predictable	 legal	mechanism	 for	 responding	 to	
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environmental	 harms,	 offering	 a	 definition	 of	 ‘environmental	 victims’	 reflective	 of	 this	
perspective:	
	
…	those	of	past,	present,	or	future	generations	who	are	injured	as	a	consequence	
of	change	to	the	chemical,	physical,	microbiological,	or	psychosocial	environment,	
brought	 about	 by	 deliberate	 or	 reckless,	 individual	 or	 collective,	 human	 act	 or	
omission.	(Williams	1996:	35)	
	
Williams	 here	 purposely	 restricts	 his	 definition	 to	 those	 suffering	 ‘injury’.	 This	 is	 in	 part	 a	
response	 to	 what	 he	 views	 as	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 so‐called	 environmental	 justice	
perspective	in	green	criminology	which	emphasises	the	involvement	of	people	and	communities	
in	 decisions	 which	 might	 impact	 upon	 their	 environment,	 defined	 broadly	 to	 include	 their	
cultural	norms,	values,	rules,	regulations	and	behaviours	(Bryant	1995:	6;	see	also	Cƽapek	1993	
and	 Hofrichter	 1993).	 Williams	 argues	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘injury’	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 wider	
notion	 of	 ‘harm’	 ‘creates	 a	 much	 narrower	 frame	 of	 reference	 than	 that	 used	 within	 the	
environmental	 justice	debate’	 (Williams	1996:	205).	The	 justification	 for	 this	 is	a	 legalistically	
pragmatic	one:	in	the	context	of	the	overall	aim	(as	Williams	sees	it)	to	achieve	a	workable	legal	
system	which	incorporates	environmental	victims,	the	author	makes	the	point	that	‘if	an	aim	of	
a	victim	conceptualization	is	to	change	policy,	then	governments	are	more	likely	to	respond	in	
relation	 to	 tight,	 manageable	 definitions,	 which	 may	 be	 stretched	 a	 little,	 than	 to	 “catch	 all”	
concepts	that	might	appear	to	carry	a	host	of	hidden	ramifications’	(Williams	1996:	205).		
	
Certainly	one	can	appreciate	the	value	of	William’s	perspective.	Indeed,	particularly	given	that	
green	criminology	(like	victimology)	often	has	some	pedigree	 in	political	activism	(see	Munro	
2012)	it	can	be	argued	that	a	major	goal	of	the	field	should	indeed	be	to	elicit	meaningful	impact	
on	the	real	world	of	policy	making	and	law,	which	means	offering	proposals	that	would	‘work’	
legally	 speaking	 as	 well	 as	 being	 conceptually	 robust.	 Of	 course,	 the	 purposeful	 under‐
estimation	 of	 environmental	 victimisation	 by	 academics	 recalls	 the	 criticism	 of	 McBarnet	
(1983)	discussed	above.	As	in	all	interdisciplinary	endeavours,	the	key	is	in	identifying	how	the	
law	and	the	study	of	the	law	can	be	used	in	conjunction	with	other	forms	of	green	criminology	
to	produce	more	robust	findings	and	impact.	Indeed	one	of	the	key	assertions	made	by	Gibbs	et	
al.	(2010)	is	that	‘[g]reen	criminology	needs	an	interdisciplinary	framework’	(Gibbs	et	al.	2010:	
129),	a	contention	I	will	return	to	at	the	end	of	this	paper.	For	these	authors,	the	difficulty	with	
much	 of	 the	 existing	 literature	 in	 this	 field	 is	 that	 it	 is	 value‐laden	 and	 presupposes	 fixed	
conclusions	 to	 environmental	 problems	 in	 the	 form	 of	 criminalisation	 and	 regulation.	 In	 the	
next	 section	 this	 paper	 I	 will	 examine	 some	 examples	 of	 the	 application	 of	 legal	 rules	 and	
analysis	 to	 green	 criminological	 discussion,	 highlighting	 the	 barriers	 to	 a	 ‘straightforward’	
application	of	any	single	legal	paradigm.	
	
Criminal,	civil	and	administrative	approaches:	Which	law	to	use?	
Whilst	criminologists	most	often	work	alongside	criminal	lawyers	and	criminal	justice	experts,	
in	the	field	of	green	criminology	other	areas	of	law	(especially	civil	and	administrative	law)	are	
also	 integral,	 and	 perhaps	 pivotal.	 This	 is	 largely	 because	 to	 some	 extent	 criminal	 law	 and	
criminal	 justice	 systems	 tend	 to	 be	 ill	 suited	 to	 the	 specific	 problems	 and	 features	 of	
environmental	 ‘offending’	 and	 victimisation	 (Brickey	 1996).	 In	 short	 form,	 criminal	 justice	
processes	 tend	 to	 be	designed	 to	 fit	 the	problem	of	 individual	 (non‐corporate)	 offenders	 and	
singular/small	 groups	 of	 their	 human	 victims.	 By	 contrast,	 green	 criminologists	 are	 often	
concerned	 with	 the	 actions	 of	 corporations,	 victimisation	 to	 large	 groups	 of	 people,	 and	
(following	 the	 less	 anthropocentric	 trend	of	 ‘deep	green’	 criminology	 (see	Gibbs	et	 al.	 2010))	
the	impact	on	non‐human	animals	and	the	ecosystem	itself.	In	the	latter	instance,	although	the	
criminal	law	has	of	course	been	expanded	in	many	jurisdictions	to	include	non‐human	victims	
(animal	protection	and	anti‐trafficking	laws	being	obvious	examples),	the	harmful	treatment	of	
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animals	can	often	 fall	within	 the	 legal	grey	area	alluded	to	above	(see	Larsen	2013)	precisely	
because	 animals	 have	 no	 legal	 standing.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 big	 business,	 the	 problem	 of	 holding	
corporations	 criminally	 liable	 has	 been	 well	 noted	 by	 criminologists	 (Bisschop	 2010)	 and	
corporate	actions	(along	with	criticisms	of	capitalism	in	general)	have	dominated	much	of	the	
green	 criminological	 discussion	 so	 far.	 Much	 has	 been	 made	 here	 of	 the	 argument	 that	
corporations	 may	 in	 fact	 be	 designed	 as	 ‘criminogenic	 creatures’	 to	 remain	 immune	 from	
prosecution	or	indeed	censure	from	any	area	of	law	(Bakan	2005).	
	
Indeed,	 despite	 the	 developments	 in	 criminal	 law	 in	 many	 national	 and	 international	
jurisdictions,	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 legal	 theory,	 attributing	 criminal	 blame	 for	 an	 environmentally	
destructive	activity	remains	a	challenging	proposition.	For	example,	 it	 is	often	difficult	 in	such	
cases	to	ascribe	direct	(or	even	indirect)	causation	between	the	actions/inactions	of	a	specific	
party	(or	state)	accused	of	bringing	about	environmental	harm	and	the	undesirable	outcomes	
themselves	(Du	Rées	2001).	This	can	be	particularly	difficult	given	the	typically	longer	timescale	
of	 environmentally	 destructive	 activities	 and	 their	 consequent	 impacts	 compared	 with	 most	
traditional	 forms	 of	 criminality.	 The	 problem	 has	 prompted	 Farber	 (2007)	 to	 argue	 that	
criminal	justice	is	unlikely	to	be	flexible	enough	to	encompass	the	possibility	of	future	harm	to	
the	environment	as	a	whole	or	to	humans	and	animals	specifically	as	a	result	of	environmental	
harms	 occurring	 in	 the	 present,	 and	 that	 the	 better	 solution	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 an	 administrative	
system	based	on	 risk	 (see	below).	 Furthermore,	 as	 noted	by	Bell	 and	McGillivray	 (2008),	 the	
extended	range	of	perpetrators	of	environmental	crime	can	seem	hopelessly	wide:	
	
A	diverse	range	of	 individuals	and	corporate	bodies	carry	out	 the	activities	that	
lead	 to	 breaches	 of	 environmental	 law,	 from	 solo	 fly‐tippers,	 to	 huge	
multinational	corporations.	(Bell	and	McGillivray	2008:	264).	
	
In	the	absence	of	a	generally	recognised	‘human	right’	to	a	clean	and	unpolluted	environment	in	
most	jurisdictions	and	the	often	ambiguous	status	of	animal	rights	in	many	criminal	(although	
not	 all:	 for	 example,	 Ecuador,	 Peru	 and	 Austria,)	 justice	 systems	 (see	 DeMerieux	 2001	 and	
Larsen	 2013	 respectively)	 the	 basis	 of	 any	 criminal	 liability	 for	 such	 activities	 and	 their	
resulting	harms	at	a	jurisprudential	level	is	often	unclear.	Indeed,	Passas	(2005)	has	highlighted	
the	particular	difficulty	in	relation	to	cross‐border	practices	which	are	legal	in	one	country	but	
not	 in	 another.	 This	 issue	 can	have	particular	 resonance	 in	 the	 environmental	 field	 given	 the	
many	examples	of	polluting	practices	literally	spilling	over	borders:		
	
Cross‐border	 malpractices	 make	 the	 best	 candidates	 for	 crimes	 without	 any	
lawbreaking	 whatsoever.	 Whether	 the	 offenses	 and	 offenders	 cross‐domestic	
state	 lines	 or	 international	 borders	 is	 immaterial.	 Asymmetries	 in	 legal	
definitions	and	law	enforcement	enable	corporations	to	do	what	is	prohibited	at	
home	in	other	jurisdictions	without	breaking	any	laws.	Processes	of	globalization	
have	multiplied	the	opportunities	for	that.	(Passas	2005:	773‐774)	
	
Given	 the	 problems	 discussed	 above	 concerning	 the	 criminalisation	 of	 environmentally	
destructive	activities,	many	commentators	have	explored	and	advocated	the	key	alternative	of	
administrative	and	civil	sanctions.	As	argued	by	the	UK	Environmental	Law	Association:	
	
…	criminal	prosecution	is	often	too	rigid	an	approach	for	all	but	the	most	serious	
offences.	 It	 focuses	 on	 achieving	 punishment	 rather	 than	 prevention,	 and	 the	
application	 of	 strict	 liability	 often	 leads	 to	 the	 imposition	 of	 unwarranted	
criminal	 blame	 for	 a	 pollution	 incident	which	has	 been	 caused	 by	 an	 oversight	
rather	than	an	intentional	act.	(Woods	2005:	5)	
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In	practice,	much	environmental	legal	regulation	is	in	fact	civil	in	nature	in	many	jurisdictions.	
Of	 course,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 emphasise	 that,	 certainly	 from	 the	 critical	 criminological	
perspective,	 the	 distinctions	 between	 these	 different	 mechanisms	 are	 not	 always	 clear‐cut:	
fundamentally,	they	are	all	set	up	to	address	or	at	 least	respond	to	social	harms	or	to	manage	
environmental	risk	(see	Mann	1992).	 Indeed,	Skinnider	(2011)	points	out	that	while	 the	term	
‘environmental	crime’	has	raised	much	debate	in	many	jurisdictions,	the	Canadian	courts	have	
established	 that	 the	 nomenclature	 of	 environmental	 ‘crimes’	 or	 ‘offences’	 or	 ‘regulatory	
offences’	 is	 irrelevant	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 guaranteeing	 the	 Canadian	 Charter	 of	 Rights	 and	
Freedoms.	 This	 means	 that	 regulatory	 provisions	 that	 amount	 to	 actual	 prohibition	 of	
blameworthy	conduct	are	found	to	be	constitutional	under	the	criminal	law.	
	
Bell	et	al.	(2013)	contend	that	the	utilisation	in	law	of	civil	resolutions	for	environmental	cases	
is	 on	 the	 increase	 in	 many	 jurisdictions	 and	 markedly	 in	 the	 UK,	 where	 a	 system	 of	 civil	
sanctions	as	alternatives	to	environmental	prosecutions	was	rolled	out	in	January	2011:	
	
The	criminal	 law,	as	a	means	of	supporting	traditional	 forms	of	regulation,	 is	to	
an	extent	being	supplemented	by	what	are	more	administrative	methods	of	law	
enforcement	–	the	use	of	environmental	civil	sanctions	being	central	here.	(Bell	et	
al.	2013:	265)	
	
More	recently,	 the	 further	extension	of	civil	sanctions	 is	presently	a	key	aspect	of	the	UK	Law	
Commission’s	 strategy	concerning	Wildlife	Crime,	with	similar	approaches	also	 in	evidence	 in	
Australia	 (Ogus	 and	 Abbot	 2013)	 and	 New	 Zealand	 (New	 Zealand	 Law	 Commission	 2012).	
Across	Europe,	 the	development	of	civil	 sanctions	 for	environmental	harms	was	prompted	by	
the	 introduction	 of	 the	 long	 anticipated	 EU	 Environmental	 Liability	 Directive	 (2004/35/EC),	
although	 this	 measure	 has	 been	 criticised	 both	 for	 a	 lack	 of	 precision	 in	 its	 mechanisms	 of	
determining	the	extent	of	injuries	to	natural	resources	(Paradossos	2005)	and	because	it	fails	to	
establish	any	genuine	EU‐wide	civil	liability	regime	(Bell	et	al.	2013).		
	
The	primary	arguments	in	favour	of	civil	sanctions	in	environmental	cases	are	that	they	allow	
for	 greater	 flexibility	 and	 are	 generally	 thought	 to	 be	 cheaper	 to	 apply	 than	 criminal	
prosecutions	(Mann	1992).	Of	course,	against	this	the	argument	can	be	put	that	civil	resolutions	
do	not	convey	the	same	social	censure	or	have	the	same	deterrence	effect	as	criminal	law	(see	
Uhlmann	 2011).	 Furthermore,	 it	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 civil	 remedy	 is	 that	 it	
responds	 to	 environmental	 harm	 but	 arguably	 does	 little	 to	 prevent	 it.	 Indeed,	 as	 noted	 by	
Tabbach	 (2012),	 paradigmatically	 civil	 law	 is	 usually	 geared	 around	 compensating	 private	
injuries	rather	than	defending	public	norms.	Thus	the	key	question	here	on	which	both	lawyers	
and	 sociologists	 may	 collaborate	 in	 finding	 answers	 is	 whether	 civil	 sanctions,	 whilst	
representing	managerial	 and	 administrative	benefits	 to	 the	 justice	 system,	 can	 also	 represent	
eco‐centric	values	for	the	environment	itself.		
	
The	above	notwithstanding,	whilst	 in	 theory	criminal	sanctions	convey	greater	social	censure,	
the	core	difficulty	identified	by	a	number	of	authors	in	practice	 is	that	criminal	 laws	are	often	
not	 rigidly	enforced	 in	 the	environmental	 field.	Faure	and	Svatikova	 (2012)	 for	example	have	
argued:	
	
Law	and	Economics	scholarship	has	pointed	to	the	fact	that	this	leads	de	facto	to	
many	cases	where	the	criminal	 law	is	effectively	not	applied	at	all	as	a	result	of	
which	 no	 sanctions	 follow.	 This	 results	 in	 under‐deterrence.	 (Faure	 and	
Svatikova	2012:	2)	
	
The	 authors	 go	 on	 to	 draw	 conclusions	 concerning	 the	 relative	 merits	 of	 criminal	 and	
administrative/civil	 sanctions	 in	 environmental	 cases	 based	 on	 a	 study	 of	 four	 European	
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jurisdictions:	 the	 Flemish	Region	 and	 the	UK	 (which	 have	 traditionally	 favoured	 the	 criminal	
route);	and	Germany	and	the	Netherlands	(which	have	traditionally	used	civil	sanctions).	Their	
conclusion	is	that	the	most	efficient	system	is	one	that	combines	criminal	prosecutions	for	the	
most	 serious	 environmental	 transgressions	 and	 administrative	 or	 civil	 sanctions	 for	 the	
majority	 of	 other	 cases.	 Such	 a	 combined	 system,	 they	 argue,	 can	 achieve	 greater	 deterrence	
effects	 than	 either	 system	 on	 its	 own.	 That	 said,	 this	 conclusion	 comes	with	 some	 important	
health	warnings:		
	
…	one	has	to	be	careful	with	generalising	the	conclusion	that	systems	that	allow	
for	a	more	balanced	use	of	the	criminal	law	(by	combining	it	with	administrative	
law	for	minor	or	moderately	serious	violations)	are	more	efficient	than	systems,	
which	merely	rely	on	the	criminal	law.	After	all,	our	data	did	not	allow	us	to	test	
the	 overall	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 differing	 approaches	 as	 far	 as	 the	 effect	 on	
environmental	 quality	 is	 concerned,	 nor	 on	 compliance	 with	 environmental	
regulation	 by	 firms.	 Moreover,	 economic	 literature	 has	 equally	 indicated	 that	
administrative	 law	 systems	may	have	 the	 disadvantage	 that	 enforcing	 agencies	
could	 enter	 into	 a	 collusive	 relationship	with	 the	 regulated	 firms	 as	 a	 result	 of	
which	also	administrative	agencies	could	not	always	 impose	efficient	sanctions.	
(Faure	and	Svatikova	2012:	33)	
	
Thus,	 the	 authors	 note	 in	 particular	 that	 they	 cannot	 demonstrate	 actual	 benefits	 to	 the	
environment	itself	as	a	result	of	this	combination	of	systems.		
	
In	 sum,	 the	 mounting	 evidence	 that	 criminal	 sanctions	 alone	 cannot	 adequately	 address	
society’s	problems	with	environmentally	destructive	activities	is	quite	persuasive.	Indeed,	given	
the	complexities	of	the	links	between	environmental	change,	changes	in	society	and	changes	in	
crime	and	social	harms	(see	Hall	and	Farrall	2012),	it	would	be	surprising	if	this	were	the	case.		
	
Of	 course,	 the	wide	 variance	 in	 the	 types	of	 cases	 falling	under	 the	 banner	 of	 ‘environmental	
transgressions’	 means	 one	 can	 never	 draw	 all‐encompassing	 conclusions.	 Indeed,	 criminal	
penalties,	 and	 in	 particular	 criminal‐based	 restitution,	 have	 on	 occasion	 proven	 a	 more	
strategically	 and	 beneficial	 option	 for	 the	 recovery	 of	 monies	 from	 environmental	 offenders	
than	civil	sanctions	(Richardson	2010).	The	example	of	the	1989	Exxon	oil	spill	off	the	coast	of	
Alaska	is	illustrative	of	the	last	point.	On	24	March	1989	the	Exxon	Shipping	Company	oil	tanker	
Exxon	Valdez	collided	with	a	reef	in	the	Prince	William	Sound	off	the	coast	of	Alaska.	As	a	result	
some	10	million	gallons	of	crude	oil	was	spilled	into	the	sound,	causing	widespread	ecological	
damage,	 especially	 to	 local	 wildlife.	 The	 US	 federal	 government	 sought	 recovery	 of	 natural	
resource	damages	to	Prince	William	Sound	‘not	by	pursuing	a	civil	claim	against	Exxon	...	but	by	
filing	 criminal	 charges’	 (Richardson	 2010:	 4).	 As	 such,	 the	 Exxon	 Shipping	 Company	 was	
charged	with	criminal	violations	of	 the	Migratory	Bird	Treaty	Act	(having	caused	the	death	of	
protected	 birds)	 and	 the	 Refuse	 Act.	 Significantly,	 both	 these	 crimes	 carried	 penalties	 that	
would	require	restitution	to	injured	parties.	In	this	case	the	injured	party	was	deemed	to	be	the	
United	States,	for	damage	to	its	natural	environmental.	The	criminal	route	was	chosen	because	
the	 relevant	 legislation	 in	 the	US	 imposed	significant	 limitations	on	 the	amount	 that	 could	be	
claimed	 from	 polluters	 under	 civil	 law.	 The	 outcome	 was	 that	 Exxon	 pleaded	 guilty	 and	 a	
settlement	 was	 reached	 through	 negotiation	 with	 the	 government	 that	 involved	 significant	
financial	 payments	 to	 the	 US	 for	 use	 in	 restoring	 the	 environmental	 damage.	 Thus,	 certainly	
from	an	eco‐centric	perspective	criminal	law	in	this	case	proved	the	better	option.		
	
Of	course,	if	green	criminology	is	to	offer	anything	new	to	such	debates,	it	may	be	necessary	to	
move	 the	 question	 of	 environmental	 regulation	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 ‘criminal	 vs	
civil/administrative’	dichotomy.	One	group	of	possibilities,	which	has	 received	relatively	 little	
attention	 up	 till	 now	 in	 the	 literature,	 involves	 attempts	 made	 in	 some	 jurisdictions	 at	
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‘environmental	mediation’	based	on	restorative	principles	(Amy	1983).	The	space	is	lacking	in	
the	 present	 chapter	 to	 discuss	 possibilities	 of	 this	 type	 in	 greater	 detail,	 albeit	 evidence	 is	
mounting	 that	 mediation	 mechanisms	 can	 achieve	 significant	 results	 for	 victims	 of	
environmental	harm	in	particular	(see	Shmueli	and	Kaufman	2006)	
	
The	contributions	of	legal	analysis	to	green	criminology	
Where	does	the	above	discussion	on	the	complexities	of	addressing	environmental	degradation	
through	 law,	 especially	 criminal	 law,	 leave	 the	 development	 of	 an	 interdisciplinary	 green	
criminology	 that	 sets	 out	 to	 combine	 the	 best	 of	more	 legalistic	 and	 socio‐legal	 approaches?	
Certainly,	on	the	one	hand,	it	would	seem	that	the	traditional	focus	of	criminology	on	crime	and	
criminal	 justice	defined	and	 internally	analysed	 in	a	 legalistic	manner	 is	not	up	 to	 the	 task	of	
representing	all	relevant	perspectives	in	this	debate.	On	the	other	hand,	it	has	been	noted	that	
most	of	the	commentators	who	advocate	a	move	away	from	criminalisation‐based	responses	to	
activities	 which	 foster	 environmental	 harm	 acknowledge	 that	 criminal	 law	 remains	 a	 viable	
option,	perhaps	even	the	preferred	option	for	the	most	serious	cases.	As	we’ve	seen,	many	more	
of	 these	commentators	 still	advocate	a	 legal	 response	 to	 the	problem	of	environmental	harm,	
albeit	 through	 civil	 and	 administrative	 mechanisms.	 In	 terms	 of	 legal	 theory,	 the	 above	
discussion	seems	to	point	towards	a	social	constructivist	view	of	the	law	whereby	law	is	seen	as	
‘an	aspect	or	field	of	social	experience,	not	some	mysterious	force	working	on	it’	and	that	 law	
and	social	ordering	are	therefore	‘mutually	constituting’	(Cotterell	2006:	25).		
	
In	terms	of	the	object	of	such	constructivist	legal	analysis,	although	clearly	the	concern	is	with	
the	 human	 and	 non‐human	 aspects	 of	 the	 environment	 and	 environmental	 harm,	 it	 may	 be	
more	 beneficial	 for	 lawyers	 to	 consider	 the	 issue	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 environmental	 risk.	 Indeed,	
increasingly	 the	 general	 trend	 in	 most	 jurisdictions	 is	 for	 public	 authorities	 to	 view	
environmentally	destructive	activities	as	an	exercise	 in	 the	management	of	 risk.	For	example,	
the	Netherlands	has	been	using	environmental	risk	assessments	as	the	basis	of	public	policy	in	
this	area	since	at	least	the	early	1990s	(de	Jongh	and	Morissette	1996).	In	the	USA,	according	to	
the	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA):	
	
EPA	 uses	 risk	 assessment	 to	 characterize	 the	 nature	 and	 magnitude	 of	 health	
risks	 to	 humans	 (e.g.,	 residents,	 workers,	 recreational	 visitors)	 and	 ecological	
receptors	 (e.g.,	 birds,	 fish,	 wildlife)	 from	 chemical	 contaminants	 and	 other	
stressors,	 that	 may	 be	 present	 in	 the	 environment.	 Risk	 managers	 use	 this	
information	 to	 help	 them	 decide	 how	 to	 protect	 humans	 and	 the	 environment	
from	stressors	or	contaminants.	(EPA	2012:	unpaginated)		
	
The	 UK	 Environment	 Agency	 similarly	 emphasises	 the	 significant	 influence	 of	 risk‐based	 (or	
‘proportional’)	approaches:	
	
We	develop	methods	 for	screening	risk	 to	allow	the	most	 important	ones	 to	be	
identified	and	placing	each	risk	in	its	true	context.	When	all	risks	are	known,	they	
can	 be	 prioritised	 to	 determine	 which	 to	 address	 first.	 (Environment	 Agency	
2014:	unpaginated)	
	
In	these	terms	the	legal	debate	may	boil	down	to	a	basic	question	of	what	combination	of	civil,	
administrative,	 mediation‐based,	 criminal	 justice	 or	 other	 legal	 –	 versus	 extra‐legal	 –	
approaches	to	the	issue	of	environmental	harm	will	minimise	the	risk	of	such	harm	occurring	or	
reoccurring.	 Certainly	 environmental	 risk	 assessments	 (ERAs)	 have	 become	 a	 key	 basis	 on	
which	 regulatory	 mechanisms	 are	 developed	 around	 industrial	 or	 other	 activities	 with	 the	
potential	 to	 cause	 damage	 to	 the	 ecosystem	 or	 affect	 the	 health	 of	 animals	 and	 humans	 (see	
Kasperson	and	Kasperson	2013).	Of	course,	ERAs	(especially	those	relying	on	more	positivistic	
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methodologies)	can	often	imply	a	degree	of	certainty	concerning	risk,	which	may	not	be	present.	
The	 risk	 perspective	 here	 reflects	 on‐going	 debates	 in	 the	 legal	 world	 concerning	 how	 law	
reacts	 to	 scientific	 uncertainty.	 Many	 authors	 have	 contributed	 discussions	 on	 how	 policy‐
makers	 are	 forced	 to	 deal	 with	 scientific	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 environmental	 field	 and	 beyond	
(Harrison	and	Bryner	2004).	For	example,	at	the	end	of	2013	there	was	considerable	scientific	
debate	underway	over	 the	potential	 or	 lack	 of	 danger	 from	 thawing	permafrost	warming	 the	
Arctic	Ocean	and	 leading	 to	a	huge	release	of	 trapped	methane	gas	 in	 the	next	decade,	with	a	
significant	 impact	 on	 global	 warming	 and,	 from	 an	 anthropocentric	 perspective,	 an	 alleged	
US$60	 trillion	 price	 tag	 for	 the	 world	 economy	 (Dyupina	 and	 van	 Amstel	 2013).	 Green	
criminology	 with	 a	 strong	 legalistic	 component	 therefore	 has	 much	 to	 offer	 towards	
strengthen[ing]	 the	 science‐policy	 interface.	 This	 includes	 discussion	 of	 knowledge	 brokering	
(van	Kammen	et	al.	2006)	and	the	interface	between	science	and	law,	which	Houck	describes	as	
a	 ‘tale	 from	 a	 troubled	 marriage’	 (Houck	 2003:	 1926).	 This	 is	 indeed	 often	 a	 difficult	
relationship	given	 that	 lawyers	 look	 to	scientists	 to	provide	certainty	whilst	scientists	 look	 to	
lawyers	to	provide	the	same,	frequently	neither	party	being	satisfied	with	the	outcome.	
	
Another	 important	 feature	 of	 legal	 analysis	 in	 the	 field	 of	 environmental	 harm	 is	 that	 such	
analysis	 will	 always	 be	 situated	 in	 the	 context	 of	 far	 wider	 regulatory	 debates.	 Many	
criminologists	have	considered	their	subject	to	encompass	not	just	the	criminal	law	specifically	
but	 the	 far	 the	 wider	 topic	 of	 regulation.	 In	 one	 influential	 example	 Ayres	 and	 Braithwaite	
(1997)	describe	enforcement	tactics	of	many	jurisdictions	in	relation	to	environmental	 ‘crime’	
by	reference	to	an	‘enforcement	pyramid’.	Essentially	this	pyramid	puts	‘persuasion’	at	its	base	
as	the	most	commonly	used	mechanism	of	environmental	 law	enforcement.	The	diagram	then	
works	 up	 the	 pyramid	 from	 persuasion	 to	 warning	 letters,	 enforcement	 notices,	 criminal	
penalties,	 suspension	 of	 operations	 licences	 and,	 at	 the	 apex	 (least	 utilised),	 revocation	 of	
licence.	Revocation	is	deemed	the	most	serious	penalty	under	this	model	because	revocation	of	
a	company’s	licence	to	operate	is	in	fact	far	more	damaging	than,	for	example,	a	relatively	small	
fine	 imposed	 by	 a	 criminal	 court.	 The	 pyramid	 represents	 a	 model	 of	 so‐called	 ‘responsive	
regulation’	 whereby	 different	 enforcement	 options	 are	 made	 available	 and	 the	 enforcement	
officer	 chooses	 the	 least	 significant	 one	 that	 will	 achieve	 an	 overriding	 goal	 of	 compliance	
(rather	than	punishment).	
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 realise	 that	 such	 wider	 discussion	 of	 regulating	 environmental	 harm	
encompasses	both	legalistic	as	well	as	extra‐legal	responses	to	the	problems	caused	by	polluting	
activities;	 and	 that	 in	 fact	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	 approaches	 is	 far	 from	 clear	 cut	
within	this	overriding	regulatory	context.	 Indeed,	to	this	end	the	difference	between	 ‘policing’	
the	criminal	law	and	enforcing	non‐criminal	and	extra‐legal	regimes	is	illusionary.	As	argued	by	
Gill	(2002):	
	
…	there	is	no	essential	difference	between	policing	and	regulation	...	the	analysis	
of	 contemporary	policing	would	beneﬁt	 if	 it	was	 seen	 as	 one	part	 of	 a	 broader	
regulatory	spectrum.	It	is	the	policing	of	‘predatory’	crime	by	‘the	usual	suspects’	
that	 comes	 closest	 to	 the	 normal	 view	 of	 policing	 as	 law	 enforcement	 while	
policing	and	regulatory	styles	are	closest	in	the	area	of	‘enterprise’	crime.	But	the	
containment	of	the	most	destructive	effects	of	the	operations	of	markets	(legal	or	
illegal)	and	ﬁrms	is	actually	the	objective	of	almost	all	policing.	(Gill	2002:	539)	
	
By	 ‘extra	 legal’	 I	 here	mean	 responses	 to	 environmental	 harms	 falling	 outside	 the	 traditional	
criminalisation	 versus	 civil	 litigation	 paradigm,	 persuasion	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 regulatory	
pyramid	 being	 a	 core	 example.	 This	 may	 also	 include,	 for	 example,	 self‐regulation	 and	 self‐
reporting	schemes.	Of	course,	such	systems	may	actually	be	well	grounded	in	statutory	law.	In	
either	case,	a	key	role	of	the	legal	scholar	is	to	help	distinguish	the	pros	and	cons	as	well	as	the	
operational	viability	of	such	systems	both	 from	an	 internal	and	an	external	 legal	analysis	(see	
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above)	 whereas	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 interdisciplinary	 green	 criminological	 project	 in	 turn	 is	 to	
combine	such	insight	with	more	sociological	and	interpretivist	perspectives	to	arrive	at	findings	
and	recommendations.		
	
Of	course,	to	these	ends	green	criminology	equally	requires	the	input	of	a	far	more	‘black	letter’	
form	of	‘hard’	legalistic	analysis	because,	as	already	noted	above,	there	is	now	a	preponderance	
of	hard	 law	 in	many	 jurisdictions	covering	a	multitude	of	diverse	and	complex	environmental	
issues	ranging	from	animal	trafficking	(Giovanini	2006)	to	genetically	modified	crops	(see	Von	
Lewinski	 2008).	 The	 ‘internal’	 analysis	 of	 case‐law,	 statute	 and	 treaties	 therefore	 remains	 as	
vital	 to	 green	 criminological	 discussion	 as	 it	 has	 proved	 to	 longer	 established	 areas	 of	
criminological	 debate	 (see	 Smartt	 2008).	 However,	 in	 the	 environmental	 sphere	 it	 might	 be	
added	 that	 it	 seems	 particularly	 important	 that	 lawyers	 of	 all	 kinds	 also	 appreciate	 the	
significance	 of	 what	 international	 lawyers	 call	 ‘soft	 law’.	 Soft	 law	 is	 usually	 considered	 to	
indicate	 non‐binding	 instruments,	 agreements	 and	 understandings	 that	 exert	 persuasive	
influence	on	parties	(usually	states).	Given	the	regulatory	landscape	sketched	out	above,	it	is	in	
fact	arguable	that	many	of	the	arrangements	at	the	national	and	international	level	concerning	
the	 regulation	 of	 environmental	 damage	 constitute	 soft	 law	 in	 some	 shape	 or	 form.	 Classic	
examples	from	the	international	environmental	law	sphere	include	the	1972	UN	Declaration	on	
the	 Human	 Environment	 and	 the	 1992	 Rio	 Declaration	 on	 Environment	 and	 Development.	
Although	soft	law	is	a	controversial	notion	for	some	(Birnie	et	al.	2009),	legal	researchers	need	
to	appreciate	how	such	soft	law	and	soft	regulations	can	add	real	impetus	and	drive	to	a	reform	
agenda	 (exerting	 genuine	 impact	 on	 the	 actions	 of	 states)	 despite	 them	 having	 little	 formal	
compulsive	power.	As	law,	the	principles	espoused	in	soft	law	also	have	a	tendency	to	‘harden	
up’	 over	 time	 (Boyle	 2006).	 The	 above	 two	 agreements	 for	 example	 have	 had	 significant	
influence	 on	 the	 development	 of	 environmental	 law	 and	 regulations	 (including	 ‘hard’	
regulation)	in	most	developed	countries.	
	
Finally,	 in	 this	 section,	 it	 would	 be	 remiss	 to	 move	 on	 without	 emphasising	 the	 growing	
importance	of	human	rights	law	to	the	question	of	environmental	harm.	In	fact	the	extension	of	
‘rights’	 concepts	 to	 the	 environment	 and	 the	 impacts	 of	 environmental	 degradation	 is	 still	 a	
novel	development,	but	one	which	is	increasingly	influential	as	a	potential	solution	to	some	of	
the	shortcomings	of	more	traditional	criminal	or	civil	based	resolution	and	redress	mechanisms	
for	 environmental	 harm	 (Coomans	 2003).	 Whilst	 much	 of	 the	 established	 literature	 and	
jurisprudence	 on	 this	 issue	 is	 focused	 around	 humans,	 from	 a	 philosophical/theoretical	
perspective,	 the	 notion	 of	 applying	 such	 rights	 to	 non‐human	 animals	 and	 perhaps	 the	
environment	 itself	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 broader	 green	 criminological	 project.	 So	 far,	 such	
‘environmental	 rights’	 as	 have	 been	 recognised	 by	 states	 and	 international	 bodies	 mainly	
constitute	an	extension	of	existing	rights	to	cover	environmental	harm,	especially	Articles	2	and	
8	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights.	There	are	significant	examples	of	distinct	rights	
to	a	green	environment	existing	in	localised	contexts,	but	these	have	not	yet	received	the	level	
of	intentional	acceptance	required	to	qualify	as	established	principles	of	the	international	legal	
order	(Redgwell	2010).	Nevertheless	the	concept	has	great	potential	to	address	many	key	green	
criminological	problems.	The	question	of	how	both	human	and	non‐human	victims	interact	with	
the	mechanism	of	 justice	 intended	 to	defend	any	such	environmental	 rights	 is	a	key	 issue	 for	
green	 criminologists	 and	 one	 still	 badly	 in	 need	 of	 theoretical	 development	 from	 experts	 in	
human	rights	law.		
	
Conclusions:	Approaching	green	criminology	from	an	interdisciplinary	perspective	
As	 noted	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 paper,	 neither	 calls	 for	 green	 criminology	 to	 pursue	 an	
interdisciplinary	 agenda	 nor	 arguments	 that	 lawyers	 can	 (and	 must)	 approach	 green	
criminology	 with	 a	 more	 interpretivist,	 socially	 constructive,	 outlook	 are,	 of	 themselves,	
especially	 path‐breaking.	 The	 benefits	 of	 interdisciplinarity	 are	 well	 known;	 whilst	 the	
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‘sociology	 of	 law’	 has	 been	 a	 topic	 of	 independent	 academic	 debate	 since	 at	 least	 the	 early	
1900s.	Nevertheless,	the	fact	remains	that,	in	the	legal	world,	talk	of	‘deep	green’	perspectives,	
the	application	of	law	to	non‐human	animals	and,	perhaps	most	significantly,	the	prevalence	of	
activities	which	are	not	 in	 themselves	unlawful	 in	either	the	criminal	or	civil	 sense	may	 leave	
some	 legal	 scholars	 doubtful	 as	 to	 their	 ability	 (or	 willingness)	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 green	
criminological	project.		
	
What	 the	above	discussion	has	 tried	 to	highlight	 is	 that,	whilst	 the	broad	range	of	 issues	and	
perspectives	which	have	fallen	under	the	umbrella	of	green	criminology	so	far	may	indeed	seem	
to	 preclude	 the	 values	 of	 certainty	 and	 consistency	 prioritised	 by	 many	 lawyers,	 in	 fact	 the	
study	of	law	and	legal	reasoning	(criminal,	civil	and	administrative)	within	the	broader	contexts	
of	risk	management	and	regulation	 is	vital	 to	 this	overall	exercise.	This	 is	not	 least	 the	case	 if	
green	criminology	is	to	succeed	in	providing	workable	solutions	to	the	vast	array	of	problems	
falling	within	the	‘environmental’	sphere.	In	contributing	to	such	an	endeavour	there	is	in	fact	
no	requirement	that	 legal	scholars	subscribe	to	deep	green	arguments:	that	non‐humans	have	
intrinsic	worth	or	any	of	the	more	activist‐inspired/associated	perspectives	concerning	animal	
rights,	animal	abuse,	and	so	on.	In	fact,	 in	light	of	the	above	discussion,	those	sceptical	of	such	
viewpoints	 can	 still	 appreciate	 the	 application	 of	 legal	 principles	 to	 the	 recognition	 of	 and	
responses	 to	 environment	 harms	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 these	 on	 the	 (non‐human)	 environment,	
including	 the	 availability	 of	 animal	 habitats,	 if	 only	 for	 the	 more	 instrumental	 purpose	 of	
establishing	how	those	effects	might	also	impact	on	humans,	crime	and	law.	It	is	clear	that	law	
and	 legal	principles	have	a	significant	 impact	on	 the	regulation	of	environmental	harms	of	all	
kinds,	 just	as	 they	 impact	on	almost	all	other	areas	of	 social	 life.	 In	other	words,	many	of	 the	
issues	 surrounding	 environmental	 risk	 and	 regulation	 are	 fundamentally	 legalistic	 questions	
even	when	‘official’	or	‘hard’	legal	censure	is	absent.	This	being	the	case,	green	criminology	must	
in	turn	incorporate	legal	analysis	as	an	essential	feature	of	its	overall	project.		
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